ALL THAT GLOWS IS NOT WARM GLOW: 
PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
SOCIAL RECOGNITION 

by 

Ratna K. Shrestha and Kwang Soo Cheong 

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Ratna K. Shrestha *
Department of Economics, Memorial University of Newfoundland

Kwang Soo Cheong
Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa

Abstract
By considering social status-seeking consumers who derive utility from the social recognition of their contributions to public goods, we investigate the efficiency and equity aspects of the equilibrium supply of public goods. Our model departs from the previous studies, such as Andreoni’s (1989, 1990) warm-glow model, in that an individual’s utility is affected only to the extent that his contribution is socially recognized and hence his social status enhanced. Specifically, his utility is represented by a function not only of his consumption of private and public goods but also his social status, which is then a function of the size of his relative contribution and the observability defined as the extent to which his relative contribution is publicly observed. This type of utility function is supported by an experimental result that we are mostly egoistic rather than altruistic in balancing our welfare with respect to that of others (Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram, 1996), and an empirical finding that anonymous donations are far less popular (Glazer and Konrad, 1996). Our model obtains a unique, stable Nash equilibrium in which the supply of public goods critically depends on the distribution of income and the observability parameter. Interestingly, an increase (decrease) in the observability for income losers (gainers), for a given income redistribution, leads to an increase in the supply of public goods. In the absence of such income redistribution, the increase in the observability of the relative contribution of low-income egoists may force them to bankruptcy. We show that grouping consumers by income levels and allowing them to play the Nash game only within their respective groups may prevent this potential problem without compromising the total supply of public goods. We also discuss the implications of our analysis in the context of global pollution control and community-based charity.

Key Words: Public Goods, Private Provision & Social Status
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* Corresponding Author. Mailing Address: Department of Economics, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, NF A1C 5S7, Canada. Phone: (709) 737-2010, Fax: (709) 737-2094, and Email: rshresth@mun.ca.
1. Introduction

In the pure altruist model of private provision of a public good, it is well known that each contributor faces a prisoner’s dilemma type of situation resulting in its underprovision. Following Becker’s (1974) suggestion, Andreoni (1989, 1990) and Hollandar (1990) have introduced a public-good model in which individual contributions are motivated by, in addition to altruism, a desire for a warm glow. This impurely altruistic (mix of both altruistic and egoistic motives) model results in a higher supply of the public good than that suggested by the pure altruist model. Under this impurely altruistic framework, Andreoni (1990) demonstrates that the redistribution of incomes will not be neutral as in the pure altruist model,¹ but will increase (decrease) the equilibrium supply of public goods if the transfer of income takes place from an egoistic (altruistic) to a more altruistic (egoistic) individual. While deriving this result, Andreoni assumes that an individual receives a warm glow for his contributions whether they are observable or not to the community. However, Glazer and Konrad (1996) argue that people usually do not contribute to public goods, particularly charity, in return for simply a warm glow but to show off their wealth and thereby achieve higher social status (or popularity).² If people donate for simply a warm glow, they would not mind making anonymous donations. However, empirical evidences from charity show that people hardly make anonymous donations. For example, out of 2240 donations that Pittsburgh Philharmonic received in

¹ Under the purely altruistic framework, Warr (1982, 1983), Russell (1984), and Bergstrom et al. (1986) have shown that the redistribution of income among consumers is neutral to the total equilibrium supply of public goods.
² This argument is analogous to the theory of conspicuous consumption that dates back to Thorstein Veblen (1899) who argued that individuals consume conspicuous goods to advertise their wealth and in turn earn higher social status or popularity. See also Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) and Bernheim (1994).
1991 only 29 were anonymous. Similarly, out of 5462 donations that Carnegie Mellon University received in 1989-1990, only 14 were anonymous (Glazer and Konrad, 1996). In light of the taste of individuals to earn social status by showing off their contributions to a public good, this paper explores the possibility of providing them higher incentives (to contribute) by making their relative contributions observable to more members of the community.

Recently, Harbaugh (1998) has analyzed how a charity can provide incentives to individuals to contribute more by publicly reporting their donations. He found that the total donation will be higher when it is reported in the form of dollar category than in exact amount. Thus, Harbaugh’s analysis shows that the incentives to contribute to public goods depend on whether the social status is a discrete or a continuous function of donations. In the present model, we consider how the social acclaim one receives and hence egoistic motive for contribution can depend on the observability of his relative contribution. For simplicity, we measure the degree of observability of a contribution in terms of the proportion of the community members who can observe it.\(^3\) The degree of observability of a contribution, irrespective of its size, depends on the nature and/or frequency of its reporting. For example, a contribution reported on TV (or several times) may have a higher degree of observability than one broadcast on radio (or fewer times). Once the community members observe the contribution, they praise the contributor. This in turn increases the social status (or egoistic) motive for contribution to the public goods.

\(^3\) This assumption makes it easier to assign the lower and upper bound for the degree of observability. The observability of a contribution is one if all the members of the community can observe it and zero if none of them can observe it.
In addition to the observability, we assume that only the contribution that is higher than the mean contribution derives social status. This assumption is plausible because social status is a relative matter. For example, if everybody makes the same level of contribution, the relative social status of the contributors would not change. We can also think of relatively low social status (or even loss of status) for all those contributions that fall below the mean. The level of one’s contribution relative to that of others largely depends on how egoistic (or altruistic) he is; highly egoistic individuals will contribute much more than less egoistic (or more altruistic) individuals and vice versa. This assumption is consistent with the experimental result of Offerman et al., (1996) that individuals contributions are guided by their ‘value orientations’—the weights they attach to their own welfare relative to that of others. Thus in the proposed model, a contribution to a public good that deviates from the mean enters the utility function twice as in Andreoni (1989, 1990) and Becker (1974) models. First, it enters as a part of a public good and, then as a part of a social status, which is private in nature. However, note that in the current model, unlike in Andreoni-Becker model, an individual’s social status depends on his relative (not absolute per se) contribution and its observability.

The above relationship, that egoistic motive for contribution increases with its observability, together with the nonneutrality result of Andreoni (1990) show that the supply of public goods can be increased, for a given income redistribution among the consumers, by increasing (decreasing) the observabilities of the relative contributions of income losers (gainers). In the absence of such redistribution, the increase in the observabilities of the relative contributions may force low-income egoists to bankruptcy, particularly when the distribution of income is highly unequal. This is because, in such a
heterogeneous group, lower-income egoists may have to contribute all of their incomes to meet the average contribution and maintain their social status. We show that the segregation of consumers into subgroups by income levels can prevent this potential problem without compromising the total supply of the public good.

Section 2 presents the basic model in which individuals contribute to a public good not only for altruistic but also for social-status reasons. In this model, the equilibrium supply of the public good increases with the observabilities of the relative contributions of the egoists. Section 3 shows that an increase (decrease) in the observability of the relative contribution of an income loser (gainer) increases the total supply of the public good. Section 4 analyzes how the segregation of the consumers into subgroups by income levels can prevent low-income egoists from bankruptcy without compromising the total supply of the public good. Section 5 briefly discusses the implications of the proposed model for the control of global pollution and raising funds for charitable services. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2. Observability of Private Contribution: Basic Model

Consider an economy with \( n \) consumers, indexed by \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, n \), of a public good, \( g \). Consumer \( i \) is endowed with \( w_i > 0 \) units of a private good which can be allocated for the consumption of private good, \( x_i \), or for the contribution, \( g_i \), to public good \( g \). The total supply of public good \( g = g_i + g_n \), where \( g_i \) is the contribution by the rest of the consumers other than \( i \). Thus, the budget constraint of \( i \) is \( x_i + g_i = w_i \).

In the impure altruism model of Andreoni (1989, 1990), each consumer's utility is represented by means of a twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave
utility function, \( u(x_p, g, g_i) \). Following Glazer and Konrad’s (1996) observation that individuals do not contribute to the public good for a ‘warm glow’ but to show off their social status, we replace \( g_i \) in the utility function with a social-status function. We assume that consumers earn (loose) social status only from those contributions which are observable and are higher (lower) than the mean contribution. Given this utility function, a public-good manager (e.g., a charity manager) can play a significant role in influencing the social-status motives for contribution of the egoistic consumers.\(^4\) The manager can report and publicize individuals’ relative contributions to the public good on TV, radio, or other publications. The members of the society who observe such contributions, in turn, accord social acclaim to the contributor. Such social acclaim instills motivation among the egoists to compete for higher contributions equal to (or above) the average, leading to the increase in the total supply of the public good.

Let us denote the social-status function for consumer \( i \) by \( r_i = \beta [g_i - g_i/(n - 1)] = \beta [g - n g_i/(n - 1)] \), where \( 0 \leq \beta \leq 1 \) measures the degree of observability of \( i \)'s contributions and is subject to a public-good manager’s policy. If all the members of the community can observe \( i \)'s relative contribution, then \( \beta = 1 \). On the other hand, if none of the community members can observe it, then \( \beta = 0 \), and as a result, \( i \) receives no social acclaim. The public-good manager can adjust the level of this policy parameter, \( \beta_i \), by changing the frequency and/or nature of reporting of \( i \)'s relative contributions. As the frequency of reporting goes up, more and more individuals will know about the contribution and, as a result, the value of \( \beta_i \) will go up. The value of \( \beta_i \) can also be

\(^4\) The previous studies that define a role for a public-good manager are Andreoni (1998) and Harbaugh (1998). Andreoni (1998), within the pure altruistic framework, shows how
adjusted by changing the font or boldness, place of the coverage (e.g., cover page or back page of charity’s bulletin) or the medium of coverage.\textsuperscript{5} If the number of people who view TV is higher than the number of people who listen to radio, then the reporting of $i$’s relative contribution on TV is more effective in raising its $\beta_i$. Thus, social status increases with both the magnitudes of $\beta_i$ and relative contribution. Note that the nature and frequency of reporting and hence the observability of a relative contribution can be independent of its magnitude. It is possible for a big (small) contribution to have a smaller (higher) observability. We can also think of a loss of social status for the contributions that fall below the average. If the contribution of an egoist falls below the average, its reporting will create social pressure upon him to contribute more.

Utility $u_i$ of consumer $i$ is assumed to be increasing in all three arguments. We also assume that all consumers contribute a positive amount of the public good. Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, each consumer chooses his contribution $g_i$, taking the contributions, $g_{-i}$, by all others as given.

$$\max_{x_i, g_i} \quad u_i(x_i, g_i + g_{-i}, r_i)$$

(1)

s. t. $x_i + g_i = w_i$

(2)

After appropriate substitutions from the budget constraint and the social-status function, $i$’s maximization problem is

\\[\text{fund raisers can turn a small amount of credible gift from the government or ‘leadership givers’ into a substantial charity.}\]

\textsuperscript{5} The size of the font or the choice of medium of publicizing of a contribution can also make easier for an individual to observe it quickly and in that sense raise its level of observability. However, for simplicity, we have limited our definition of the degree of observability of a contribution to the proportion of the community members who come to know about such contribution.
\[
\text{Max } u_i(w_i - g + g_{-i}, g, \beta_i(g - \frac{n}{n-1} g_{-i})).
\] 

(3)

Considering only the interior solution, the first order condition of this maximization problem is

\[- \frac{\partial u_i}{\partial x_i} + \frac{\partial u_i}{\partial g} + \frac{\partial u_i}{\partial r_i} \beta_i = 0
\]

or
\[\frac{\partial u_i / \partial g}{\partial u_i / \partial x_i} = 1 - \frac{\partial u_i / \partial r_i}{\partial u_i / \partial x_i} \beta_i,
\]

(4)

where \(\frac{\partial u_i / \partial r_i}{\partial u_i / \partial x_i}\) is \(i\)'s marginal rate of substitution between social status and private good, \(\beta_i\), \((MRS'_{\beta g}, x_i)\). Similarly, \(\frac{\partial u_i / \partial g}{\partial u_i / \partial x_i} = MRS'_{g x}\). Clearly, with the introduction of the social-status motive for contribution, the equilibrium level of the public good would be higher than that it would be without it, thereby coming closer to the optimal solution. The optimal solution,\(^6\) characterized by \(\sum MRS'_{g x} + MRS'_{r x} \beta_i = 1\), can be achieved when the public-good manager adjusts the degrees of observabilities of the relative contributions in such a way that \(\sum MRS'_{r x} \beta_i - MRS'_{r x} \beta_i = n - 1\).

Solving the first order condition, we get the Nash supply function of \(g\) that takes as arguments the exogenous variables of the maximand

\[g = f_i(w_i + g_{-i}, \frac{n \beta_i}{n-1} g_{-i}, \beta_i).
\]

(5)

The first argument is what Becker (1974) calls a 'social wealth.' The derivative of \(f_i(.)\) with respect to the first argument, \(f_i'\), measures the marginal propensity to donate for

\(^6\) Note that the optimal condition differs from the standard Samuelsonian condition due to the presence of an additional benefit (in terms of social status) from contribution \(g_i\), which is private in nature.
altruistic reasons. If both the public good and private good are normal for all consumers, then $0 < f_{w} < 1$. The second argument is due to the social-status motive for contribution. The derivative of $f(.)$ with respect to this argument, $f_{w}$, measures the marginal propensity to donate for egoistic or social status reasons (see Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Becker, 1974 and Roberts, 1987). If both the private and public goods are normal, the value of $f_{w} > 0$ (see Andreoni, 1990 for the derivation of this result). The third argument is due to the presence of the term in the first order condition. The derivative of $f(.)$ with this term, $f_{\beta}$, is positive.

**Lemma 1** (Existence, Uniqueness, and Stability): If preferences are represented by continuous and strictly quasi-concave utility functions $u_{i}(x_{i}, g, r_{i})$ and both public good, $g$, and private good, $x_{i}$, are normal, then for some plausible levels of observabilities, $\beta$'s, of relative contributions to the public good, a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the contribution game exists. Moreover, if $0 < f_{w} + n\beta_{i}f_{\beta}/(n - 1) \leq 1$, such an equilibrium is stable.

(See Appendix for the proof.)

**Proposition 1**: If at least one consumer is impurely altruistic with social-status function given by $r_{i} = \beta_{i} [g_{i} - g_{i}/(n - 1)]$, the equilibrium supply of public good, $g$, increases with the observabilities $\beta$'s of the relative contributions.

Proof: Totally differentiating Eq. (5), and then rearranging the terms, we get
\[ dg = \frac{1}{c} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (1 - \alpha_i) \left[ \frac{(n-1)f_{ir}}{\beta_i fr} \right] + \frac{g_{iw}}{\beta_i} \]  

(6)

where \( \alpha_i = \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial w_i} = \frac{f_{iw}}{f_{ir}} \) and \( c = 1 + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\alpha_i - f_{iw}}{f_{ir}} > 0 \)

The coefficient \( \alpha_i \) (\( 0 \leq \alpha_i \leq 1 \)) measures the degree of altruism. The higher the relative value of \( f_{iw} \) relative to \( f_{ir} \), the more altruistic is consumer \( i \); when \( \alpha_i = 1 \), \( i \) is a pure altruist and when \( \alpha_i = 0 \), a pure egoist or a pure status seeker (see Andreoni, 1990 for this concept).

From Eq. (6), it is straightforward that when all consumers are pure altruists, that is \( \alpha_i = 1 \) for all \( i \), as expected, an increase in \( \beta_i \) cannot enhance the equilibrium supply of \( g \). This is because a pure altruist has no incentive to contribute to the public good for status reasons. But when \( \alpha_i < 1 \) for at least one consumer, an increase (decrease) in \( \beta_i \) can increase (decrease) the equilibrium supply of the public good. Thus, if all the consumers are purely egoists, this mechanism will work at its best. Q.E.D.

The intuition behind the above result is that an increase in \( \beta_i \) increases \( i \)'s social status and hence his egoistic motives for the contribution to the public good. We also observe from Eq. (6) that the marginal effect of \( \beta_i \) on \( g \) is diminishing in \( \beta_i \)—higher the level of \( \beta_i \), the smaller is its marginal effect on \( g \). On the other hand, the marginal effect of \( \beta_i \) on \( g \) increases with the number of consumers because \( n/(n-1) > N/(N-1) \) for all \( N > n \).

3. Non-neutrality of Income Distribution
In the purely altruistic model, Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) show that the total supply of a public good is independent of the distribution of income. However, this theoretical result is not consistent with the empirical findings. For example, an empirical study by Hochman and Rodgers (1973) shows that the size distribution of income significantly affects the donation patterns to local charities. Andreoni (1989, 1990) argues that impurely altruistic motives for contribution to a public good may be one reason for the nonneutrality of the distribution of income. Under this impurely altruistic model, he demonstrates that the redistribution of income from egoistic to more altruistic individuals will increase total contribution. In this section, we analyze how the observability of a relative contribution can affect the total supply of the public good brought about by such income redistribution.

**Proposition 2:** Given the preference and budget constraint of consumer $i$ by (1) and (2) respectively, an increase (decrease) in the observability, $\beta$, of the relative contributions of a income loser (gainer), for a given income redistribution, increases the total contribution to the public good.

**Proof:** Let $dw = (dw_1, dw_2, \ldots, dw_n)$, then income redistribution among the consumers implies that $\sum dw_i = 0$. Totally differentiating the Nash supply function given by Eq. (5) and rearranging the terms

$$dg = \frac{1}{c} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i dw_i$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

This is identical to the result obtained by Andreoni (1990). The result says that income transfer will increase (decrease or not change) the total supply of public goods, if
income gainer is less egoistic (more egoistic or as egoistic as) the income loser.

However, in the current model, unlike in Andreoni’s model, \( \alpha \) depends not only on \( f_{lw} \) and \( f_{lu} \), but also on \( \beta \) and \( n \). In particular, the value of \( \alpha \) decreases (increases) with the increase (decrease) in the value of \( \beta \) and its effect is more pronounced when \( n \) is higher. The implication is that the total supply of the public good can be increased by increasing (decreasing) the observabilities of relative contributions of income losers (gainers).

\[ Q.E.D. \]

Our result is consistent with the notion of equity in the sense that the increase in the observability of relative contributions of income losers (that is, richer consumers) provides them higher incentives to contribute to the public goods. However, when there is no income redistribution in the economy, one way to increase the total supply of the public good, as shown in the previous section, is to increase the observability of the relative contributions of the egoists. One disadvantage of this proposal is that it may force poor egoists to bankruptcy. If the distribution of income among the contributors is highly unequal and the considered public good is a substantial fraction of their combined income, lower-income egoists may have to contribute all of their incomes to meet the average contribution and thus maintain their social status. In the following section, we propose a scheme which can address this potential problem of bankruptcy without compromising the total equilibrium supply of the public good.

4. Neutrality of Income-Group Segregation
This problem of potential bankruptcy can be prevented by segregating contributors into subgroups by income levels and allowing them to play the Nash game only within their respective groups (not across the groups). If individuals with close income levels are grouped together, they would more likely be able to finance the contribution which is closer to their group-specific average contribution. Intuition says that in a homogenous (by income) group, group members will have less incentive to contribute. Contrary to this intuition, we show that the regrouping of individuals according to their incomes has no effect on the total contribution to the public good.

**Lemma 2.** If the contributors, each of whose preference and budget constraint are given by (1) and (2) respectively, are segregated into $k$ subgroups with number of contributors in group $j = 1, 2, ..., k$ equal to $n_j$ such that \( \sum_{j=1}^{k} n_j = n \) and are allowed to play the Cournot-Nash game only within their respective group, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of such a contribution game is unique and stable, if \( 0 < f_{w} + n_j \beta_j f_{w}/(n_j - 1) \leq 1. \)

(The proof is similar to that for lemma 1.)

**Proposition 3:** If the contributors are segregated into subgroups by income levels and are restricted to play the Cournot-Nash game only within their respective subgroups, it prevents low-income egoists (status seekers) from bankruptcy without compromising the total supply of the public good.

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7 Falkinger (1996) discusses this advantage of partitioning a group into subgroups in a different setting in which he uses a tax-subsidy mechanism for deviation from the average contribution. However, he does not analyze the effects of regrouping individuals by income on the total supply of the public good.
To prove this proposition, we need to show that the total supply of a public good is independent of the number of subgroups of contributors and their regrouping by income levels. With the partitioning of contributors, the Nash supply function of the public good is

\[ g = f_i^j (w_i + g_{j-i} + g_{-j}, \frac{n_j \beta_i}{n_j - 1} g_{j-i} + \beta_j g_{-j}, \beta_j) \]  

(8)

and the contribution by individual \( i \) in subgroup \( j \) is

\[ g_{ij} = f_i^j (w_i + g_{j-i} + g_{-j}, \frac{n_j \beta_i}{n_j - 1} g_{j-i} + \beta_j g_{-j}, \beta_j) - g_{j-i} - g_{-j}, \]  

(8')

where \( g_j \) is the rest of the contributions other than from group \( j \), \( g_{j-i} \) is the rest of the contributions from members of group \( j \) other than \( i \). Since \( \sum_i g_{ij} = g, \; g = g_j + g_{-j} \).

Similarly, superscript (or second subscript) in \( f \) (or \( w, \alpha \), and \( \beta \)) denotes the subgroup in which individual \( i \) belong. Totally differentiating Eq. (8') for a given \( \beta \) and rearranging terms, we get

\[ dg = \frac{\sum_i \alpha_{ij} dw_{ij}}{c \sum_i \frac{f_{iw}^j (n_j - 1)}{\beta_i f_{iw}^j (n_j - 1) - 1}} \]

\[ \text{where } c = 1 + \frac{\sum_i \frac{\alpha_{ij}^j f_{iw}^j (n_j - 1) - 1}}{\beta_i f_{iw}^j (n_j - 1)} - \frac{\sum_i \frac{\beta_j f_{iw}^j (n_j - 1)}{\beta_i f_{iw}^j (n_j - 1)} - 1}{c} > 0. \]

We can easily verify that the term in the denominator is positive if at least one consumer is a status seeker.
To see how group size on its own affects the impact of the redistribution of income on the Nash supply of the public good, we assume that $f_{iv} = f_{uw}$ for all $i$, $f_{ir} = f_r$ for all $i$, and $\beta_i = \beta$ for all $i$ across all $j$. In this situation, altruism coefficients of the consumers in the same subgroup are also equal, that is $\alpha_{ij} = \alpha_j$ for all $j$. With these substitutions, Eq. (9) reduces to

$$dg = \frac{1}{c} \sum_{j=1}^{s} \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} dw_{ij}$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)$$

Eq. (10) shows that for given levels of $f_{iv}, f_{ir}$ and $\beta$, the redistribution of income within the same subgroup as well as across the subgroups is neutral to the total supply of the public good. For example, if there is a redistribution of income from say consumer 2 to consumer 1 within group $j$, then $dw_{ij} = -dw_{2j} = dw_j$. Substituting these values in Eq. (10), we get $dg/dw_j = 0$.

We can also interpret the result of Eq. (10) as that the size of the subgroups or number of subgroups (that is values of $n_j$ or $k$) and the regrouping of individuals (irrespective of their income levels) into different subgroups on its own do not affect the total supply of the public good. \textit{Q.E.D.}

5. Applications of the Model: Two Examples

The proposed model is consistent with the situation where no central authority with a coercive power to tax or subsidize voluntary contributions to public goods exist. It defines a role for a public-good manager to provide nonmonetary incentives (in the form of social status) to the potential contributors by making their relative contributions observable to more members of the society. Thus, this model may have wide
applications, particularly in situations where the central authority with a coercive power to tax or subsidize voluntary contributions to public goods does not exist.

5.1 Global Pollution Control

The reduction of global environmental pollution, such as the effects of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) on ozone layer and greenhouse gases (GHGs) on global climate, is a typical example of a public-good problem where the United Nations (or other international organization) can play an important role. This is particularly true in light of the fact that no central authority that has a mandate to tax or subsidize individual nations exists. The United Nations can report the efforts of each country to reduce global pollution in the international forum. It can rank the individual countries according to their deviations from the mean effort of reduction. Alternatively, the United Nations or some other international organization\(^8\) may rank the countries according to their deviations from the agreed upon responsibilities for emission reductions in international forums, such as Montreal and Kyoto conventions. Such information on the ranking of each country can be disseminated in the international forum periodically. If countries care about their social status in the international community, such publicizing will create incentives among them to compete for higher levels of emission reductions or to comply with their obligations as agreed in the international conventions.\(^9\)

\(^8\) At present, World Resource Institute (WRI) periodically estimates the emissions of some greenhouse gases for selected countries and rank them according to their efforts for removing these gases by direct control or by creating sinks, such as forest (see WRI, 1990).

\(^9\) At present, each country has a responsibility, as agreed in the international conventions, to reduce pollution independent of other nations; there is no institutional framework where one can compete with others in controlling GHGs or CFCs.
However, the relative reporting of emissions control has some disadvantage as discussed in Section 4; it can force nations who are poorer but care about their status in the international community to bankruptcy. Some poorer nations’ total emissions may be so small that if they are grouped with richer nations with higher emissions, they might have to completely reduce their emissions to meet the average reduction and thus maintain their social reputation. Segregation of nations into subgroups according to their economic performances or income levels, such as less developed and industrial, can prevent this problem without affecting the total reduction of emissions. In addition, such partitioning based on incomes can allow poorer nations to make their fair contribution based on their incomes.

5.2 Community-Based Charity

Many charities around the world provide incentives to donors, in one or other forms, to solicit donations. For example, Arts Institute in Chicago determines the sizes of the plaques honoring the donors based on the size of donations. Similarly, London’s Royal Academy of Arts does not reveal the exact amount of donations but the dollar bracket within which the donation falls by classifying them into five observable categories viz: plain, bronze, silver, gold, and gold and silver (Elster, 1989). We can think of such a priori categorization in terms of the degrees of observabilities of donations. For example, we can think of a gold contribution having a higher degree of observability than a silver donation because gold contribution may be noticed by a greater number of people in the
community. We can also think of a silver contribution as the average level, gold above the average, and plain below the average contribution.\textsuperscript{10}

Moreover, such a priori categorization of donations can be explained in terms of the model presented in Section 4. Such segregation of donation categories allows egoistic donors to have an opportunity to self-select their own groups. Thus, individuals with comparable income and/or comparable egoistic behavior end up in the same subgroup.

6. Concluding Remarks

By considering social status-seeking (egoistic) consumers who derive utility from the social recognition of their contributions to public goods, this paper explores how the observability of such contributions can affect the total supply of public goods in equilibrium. The level of observability of a private contribution depends on the nature and or frequency of contribution reports. For example, the contributions reported on TV (or many times) may be observed by more members of the community and thus have the higher observability than the ones broadcast on radio (or fewer times). Given that redistribution of income from egoistic to altruistic consumers increases the total supply of public goods (Andreoni, 1990) and that consumers’ social status depends on the observabilities of their relative contributions, the change in such observabilities can be crucial in determining such impact of income distribution. In particular, we show that an increase (decrease) in the observabilities of the relative contributions of income losers (gainers) can increase the total equilibrium supply of public goods. However, in the

\textsuperscript{10} In this sense, Harbaugh (1998) model can be viewed as a special case of the present model with observability as a function of the size of donation.
absence of such income redistribution, increases in the observabilities of the relative contributions may force low-income egoists to bankruptcy, if the distribution of incomes among them is highly unequal. This is because, in such a heterogeneous group (by income), lower-income egoists may have to contribute all of their incomes to meet the average contribution and maintain their social status. We show that the segregation of consumers into subgroups by income can prevent this potential problem without compromising the total supply of the public good.

The immediate extensions of this paper would include an empirical test or laboratory experiment of the proposed model. Since the implementation of the proposed model requires no central authority with coercive power (to tax or subsidize consumers), it can have a wide range of applications including for the control of global pollution and collection of charitable funds. In the case of global pollution, it would be interesting to see how different forms and numbers of partitioning (based on income levels) of nations would affect the equilibrium levels of emissions control of each nation (without affecting the total control). In the case of charity, it would be interesting to see how a priori formation of different donation categories based on their magnitudes, such as diamond, platinum, gold, or silver would affect the contribution game. Another interesting extension would be to study the welfare implications of the partitioning of contributors into subgroups.
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1:

The proof for the existence is a straightforward application of Brouwer fixed-point theorem (see Bergstrom et al., 1986). So, we will provide the proof for the uniqueness and the stability of the equilibrium.

Adapting the method employed by Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996, proof of theorem 1), we suppose that there exist two Cournot-Nash equilibria represented by \( g_1, g_2, \ldots, g_n \) \( x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n \) and \( g'_1, g'_2, \ldots, g'_n, x'_1, x'_2, \ldots, x'_n \) for given \( \beta_i \)'s. Let \( g' = \sum_i g'_i \geq g = \sum_i g_i \).

Since \( g' = f_i(w_i + g_{-i}', \frac{n\beta_i}{n-1} g_{-i}', \beta_i) \) and \( g = f_i(w_i + g_{-i}, \frac{n\beta_i}{n-1} g_{-i}, \beta_i) \), we have \( g_{-i}' \geq g_{-i} \) for all \( i \) and \( g'_{-i} > g_{-i} \) for some \( i \). This implies that \( g' > g \).

Since \( x_i \) is a normal good whose price is normalized and \( g_{-i}' \geq g_{-i}, x_i' = x_i(l, w_i + g_{-i}') \geq x_i(l, w_i + g_{-i}) = x_i \) for all \( i \) and with strict inequality for some \( j \neq i \). Therefore, \( \sum_i x_i' > \sum_i x_i \). But in equilibrium, the total contributions to the public good and the total consumption of the private good must be equal to the total initial endowment of the private good. That is, \( \sum_i x_i' + g' = \sum_i w_i = \sum_i x_i + g \). Since \( \sum_i x_i' > \sum_i x_i \) it must be that \( g' < g \) -- a contradiction to our initial assumption that \( g' > g \). Therefore, there cannot be two Nash equilibria.

The stability of the equilibrium can be proved as follows. Subtracting \( g_{-i} \) from both sides of Eq. (5), we get the reaction function of \( i \) as a function of the rest of the contributions.

\[
g_i(g_{-i}) = f_i(w_i + g_{-i}, \frac{n\beta_i}{n-1} g_{-i}, \beta_i) - g_{-i}
\]

Partially differentiating with respect to \( g_{-i} \), we get the slope of the reaction function of \( i \)
\[ \frac{\partial g_i(g_{-i})}{\partial g_{-i}} = f_{iw} + \frac{n \beta_i}{n-1} f_{iw} - 1 \]

From the slope of the reaction function, we can directly infer that if \( 0 < f_{iw} + n \beta_i f_{iw}/(n-1) \leq 1 \), \( \frac{\partial g_i}{\partial g_{-i}} \leq 0 \) for all \( i \) and is flatter than \( \frac{\partial g_i}{\partial g_i} \) (see Fig. 1). Although the Cournot-Nash game is of one-shot nature, we can think of, as did by Cournot in the study of Oligopoly, a dynamic nature of the game in which each contributor refines its belief about others' contributions by observing their actual contributions. In general, we can think of the contribution of \( i \) in period \( t \) given by \( g'_t = g_t(g_{-i}') \). Given this dynamic nature of the game and the slope of \( g_t(g_{-i}) \) flatter than that of \( g_t(g_i) \), individuals adjust their contributions in the direction of their best responses, leading to the stability of the dynamic interior equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Figure 1. Stability of Nash Equilibrium.
References:


