Games with Dynamic Externalities and Climate Change ExperimentsTatsuyoshi Saijo Katerina Sherstyuk Nori Tarui Majah-Leah Ravago Abstract We conduct experiments of games with dynamic externalities, where players' decisions made in a stage game influence the stage game to be played in the next period (as in the cases of climate change and biological diversity management). We contrast the findings from a game with long-lived players and those from a game played by generations of different players. While long-lived players tend to support non-myopic outcomes where negative externalities to future periods are reduced, generations of different players tend to choose myopic decisions. In the latter case, some subjects supported less myopic outcomes when each generation's payoff depends on the current as well as the future generations' payoffs. Extensions of this research address two aspects of intertemporal collective action: (1) people's other-regarding behavior in the presence of dynamic externalities and (2) the design of a self-enforcing international treaty to support cooperation across generations. |