Brooks Kaiser
Gettysburg College

Abstract

The Athenian liturgical system in the Classical period (479-322 BCE) provided a private, voluntary solution for the provision of public goods where direct government taxation and public procurement were not feasible. Today, it provides an interesting opportunity to evaluate mechanism design policies in action. The provision of naval defense was at the core of this liturgical system, and we evaluate its success, in light of the conflicting goals of budget balance, efficiency, and feasibility. The incentives of Athenian citizens are evaluated within the context of the asymmetric information driving the institutional framework. There are multiple equilibria to the game. In most of the equilibria, citizens do not volunteer for duty and may attempt to hide their wealth and/or seek legal recourse in order to avoid costly duties, though some may choose to perform their duty if selected. This corresponds to historical events, in which certain citizens frequently performed even more naval services than required, and multiple outcomes are observed.

Download Seminar Paper. (PDF)