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Recent Publications

Paper Link Han, H., Julien, B., Petursdottir, A., & Wang, L. : Equilibrium using credit or money with indivisible goods, Journal of Economic Theory, November 2016.

Paper Link Fuleky, P., and Ventura, L.: Mean Lag in General Error Correction Models, Economics Letters, June 2016

Paper Link Kirwan, B. E., & Roberts, M. J. : Who Really Benefits from Agricultural Subsidies? American Journal of Agricultural Economics, June 2016.


Seminars

Date: Friday, February 24, 2017 at 3 pm.
Room: Saunders 515
Title: Circulation Under Responsive Preferences
Speaker: Szilvia Papai
Institution: Concordia University, Montreal

We study generalized Shapley-Scarf markets in which each agent is endowed with multiple units of an indivisible agent-specific good. An outcome is given by a circulation which consists of a balanced exchange of goods among agents without monetary compensations. Agents have responsive preferences over the bundles they receive. We prove that for general capacity configurations there is no circulation rule that satisfies the main properties of individual rationality, Pareto-efficiency, and strategy-proofness. We explore the incentive and efficiency properties of a generalized TTC rule, the Circulation Top Trading Cycle (cTTC) rule, which is Pareto-efficient for lexicographic preferences, and provide a characterization of this rule. We also consider the family of Segmented Trading Cycle (STC) rules which restrict the exchange of goods to separate market segments and show that, unlike the cTTC, STC rules are strategyproof. We characterize one particular member of this family, called the SSTC rule, which satisfies a unanimity property similarly to cTTC. Finally, we identify the capacity configurations for which the three main properties are compatible, and show that for these special configurations the cTTC rule is identical with the SSTC rule, which is the unique rule that satisfies all three properties.